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On Valuation 
In the early days of a discipline whose origins were inspired by the taxonomic impulse of the 
natural sciences, anthropology attempted to understand different human societies in relation to 
Western civilization within an evolutionary framework. Anthropologists thus described and 
organized their empirical observations in categorical bundles. Nevertheless, the data always 
exceeded the categories that anthropologists devised, which prompted the researchers to come up 
with new categories or, alternatively, disregard, silence, or miscategorize what did not fit. 
Anthropologists’ attempts to develop theories of kinship offer a good example of the 
problems they faced: to explain inconsistencies, they multiplied taxonomies, or attributed them 
to process, to the fuzziness of categories, or to change over time. An early example of how the 
messiness of the taxonomic problems that kinship systems presented is E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s 
(1940) classic monograph on the Nuer, which he described as a fiercely egalitarian society fixed 
on patrilineal descent. After painstakingly drawing out the lineage categories, their spatial 
organization, and their structural dynamics of fusion and fission, Evans-Pritchard concedes that 
in actual practice, bilateral descent was as important as patrilineal descent, alliance was as 
important as descent with frequent adoptions, and that there were deep structural inequalities 
under the public veneer of egalitarianism, all of which he labeled “transient.” However, if one 
begins with these exceptions to reanalyze Nuer social structure, the resulting picture one obtains 
of Nuer society at the time turns out completely different (McKinnon 2000). What Evans-
Pritchard considered transient and out of place now emerges as part and parcel of the system and 
provides a very different perspective on the system as a whole. Likewise, John Comaroff (1980) 
analyzes marriage payments among the Tshidi of South Africa as an ambiguous, time-bound, 
and flexible relationship that entangles multiple generations (alive, dead, and yet-to-be-born) in a 
maze that can always be reconfigured and reinterpreted as something else, and he then goes on to 
deconstruct the category of marriage in African bridewealth societies. 
Anthropology offers a long genealogy of concern with that which does not fit in 
established classification systems, or at least do not fit easily. Yet, for a long time, 
anthropologists were primarily concerned with “solving” the puzzle of matter that does not fit. 
For example, the theory of liminality developed by Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner 
constructed liminality as a valuable yet temporary state, a perilous transition between stable 
states that would eventually reaffirm stability. For Mary Douglas, society needs matter out of 
place to reaffirm its coherence and order, but also to harness its potential power. While “dirt is 
essentially disorder” and “disorder spoils pattern” (1991: 2),  
it also provides the materials for pattern. Order implies restriction; from all possible 
materials, a limited selection has been made and from all possible relations a limited set 
has been used. So disorder by implication is unlimited, no pattern has been realised in it, 
but its potential for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though we seek to create order, 
we do not simply condemn disorder. We recognize that it is destructive to existing 
patterns; also that it has potentiality. (1991: 94) 
And society, which she defines as form in contrast to nonform, does so by ritually taming, 
reconfiguring and finding a place for nonform. 
It is only relatively recently that anthropologists have questioned these assumptions. 
Having abandoned the organic structural idea of a unique and complete social order, with its 
categories and oppositional structure (e.g., lineages, myths), the discipline has taken a pioneering 
role among the social sciences in showcasing the fact that different understandings of society 
coexist, but are locked in a struggle for domination, and that categories are fundamentally 
unstable and fuzzy. For example, the theory of perspectivism, based on Amerindian mythology 
and shamanistic practices, introduced a fluid categorical framework that superseded the nature-
culture dichotomy. It suggested that humans and nonhumans shared a common primordial 
humanity, a “culture,” but differed in their physical representation, their “nature.” This view 
inverted Western understandings of the nature-culture categorization where culture was the 
variable attached to humanity, and nature was what humans shared with other species. This 
“multinaturalist” process supported practices of metamorphosis between species that underlined 
the ambivalent subjective positions of humanity in different world orders (Descola 2013; 
Viveiros de Castro 2012). Drawing on ethnographies of Melanesian societies, anthropologists 
like Marilyn Strathern (1988) have exposed the relational, mutable, and partible character of 
personhood and identity, while others have demonstrated that sex-gender categories are 
predicated on the exchange of matter like blood and food among people, nature, and cosmology 
(e.g., Herdt 1984; Meigs 1984). Rather than being in transition to greater legibility, persons, 
objects, and categories that fail to conform to stable states can remain in protracted or permanent 
suspension. Matter out of place, the abject, the marginal, and the exceptional can, in fact, provide 
a very different perspective on the system that marginalizes them. They thus need to be taken 
seriously. 
This collection of ethnographic essays does just that by proposing a novel angle on the 
question through the lens of indeterminacy. In their introduction, Catherine Alexander and 
Andrew Sanchez explain that indeterminacy has three fundamental features: it is not recognized 
by extant systems of classification; its course in the future is unknown; and it resists and 
questions classificatory systems. Indeterminacy differs from other analytic tools that have been 
mobilized in the past. For example, in contrast to Mary Douglas, who considers purity and 
impurity (and its variants) as structured in reference to one another and to a world conceived as a 
whole, Alexander and Sanchez see indeterminacy as constituting a third, in-between modality 
that does not lend itself to binary classification, while both value (purity) and waste (impurity) 
are aspects of form. They consider “classification, as a way of apprehending reality, [as] itself 
essentially indeterminate.” 
Indeterminacy is constitutive of classification systems based on the opposition between 
value and waste in that it plays a mediating role in their production, a point to which we will 
return presently. But the opposition is the result of a process of selection (what has value and 
what does not), which raises the question of the criteria upon which this selection is predicated. 
“To classify is human” (Bowker and Star 1999: 1), but inherent to classification is a 
semantic vagueness about categories that do not fall neatly in a system of inclusion and 
exclusion. The category “other” is often mobilized as a loophole for such categories. Although 
many classification systems consist of competing or overlapping categories that exert control and 
moral legitimacy (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991), much of what goes on in everyday life is at 
best vaguely ascribed to a category because its semantic vagueness is “good enough” to get on 
with ordinary matters. Thinking of the binary contrast between value and waste as resulting from 
choices that free agents make in a process of adjudicating value is what produces indeterminacy. 
For example, despite its anxiety to produce order, state bureaucracy in fact often works through 
vagueness, as in the case of how state agents interpret the law (a system of classification par 
excellence) in a discretionary and flexible fashion (Dubois 2010). Classifications often make 
space for arbitrary application, while at the same time creating anxieties that preclude agency. 
Valuation is a complex process. For example, one can distinguish three distinct principles 
of classificatory judgments for comparing things and people (Fourcade 2016). Nominal 
judgments are conceptual acts predicated on essence that generate categories and interpretive 
acts that fit objects into these categories. Cardinal judgments, predicated on quantities, measure 
difference and assess its significance. While ordinal judgments, predicated on relative positions 
and designed to rank objects, create inequalities. In social life, nominal judgments of kind 
intersect with ordinal judgments of worth and, in ideologically democratic and egalitarian 
societies, ordinal judgments that rank nominal difference are measured through the quantification 
of individual “choices” (Fourcade 2016: 182–84). Statistical ranking makes difference 
commensurable. Tools that measure equivalence, such as money, assess value, but they also 
produce hierarchies. What Jane Guyer (2004) calls “performances of valuation” involve 
intersecting ordinal and cardinal judgments in which negotiations over different scalar values 
measure hierarchically ordered qualities and enable commensuration, a process that allows for 
disjunctures between numerical scales that may become sources of gain. The different scales of 
valuation constitute a “repertoire” that is performed and enacted in different occasions (2004: 
51–67). In practice, then, binary classificatory systems and indeterminacy as a “third” concept 
result from the failure of classificatory practices that are at best an ideal type. Indeed, many of 
the cases analyzed in this volume can be understood as struggles over different, incomplete, and 
often vague categorical schemes. 
For example, in her analysis of Russian-speaking miners in Estonia and Kazakhstan, 
Eeva Kesküla invokes indeterminacy to explain how this group lost its former place in society 
when the Soviet Union collapsed. The miners lost their social privileges as Russians, miners, 
highly remunerated workers, and gendered laborers in the new political and economic order. 
They are disrespected as anachronisms, their work is devalued, and they feel that others see them 
as slaves, scum, or nobodies. But they claim a different grid of valuation, which showcases hard 
work, sacrifice, skill, the health hazards they endured, and their contribution to the national 
wealth. Their social position is thus riddled with ambiguities and overlaps. The miners claim 
social worth within shifting regimes of value. Loss of status increases uncertainty and devalues 
social expectations, yet the miners are aware of their relational value position in the present order 
and contest it. Similarly, the transgender activists among whom Elena Gonzalez-Polledo 
conducted fieldwork use their experimental art to disrupt identity politics and resist institutional 
contexts that universalize the category transgender. 
 
Liminality, Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and Indeterminacy 
According to Alexander and Sanchez, indeterminacy differs from a number of cognate analytic 
categories, such as liminality, ambiguity, and uncertainty. In its original theorization, liminality 
always implied a transition from one stable state (e.g., childhood) to another stable state (e.g., 
adulthood). In contrast, indeterminacy does not imply that an entity that is taken out of a stable 
state will eventually be reintegrated into another. The detached fragment becomes a particle 
whose future configuration may be indeterminate. Here an analogy to Heisenberg’s theory of 
indeterminacy in quantum physics and its philosophical extension in metaphysical indeterminacy 
is useful (Barnes 2010; Skow 2010; Torza 2017; Williams 2008). Metaphysical indeterminacy 
shares commonalities with semantic vagueness but it extends its purchase to actual worlds and is 
therefore analogically closer to quantum physics. Hence the classical anthropological concept of 
liminality gives way to a position where all future outcomes are not only possible but may in 
reality all coexist. Contingency is the anthropological version of this multiple actuality. 
However, in its quantum physics version, indeterminacy is not absolute but statistically relative. 
In an analogous manner, contingency is not the equivalent of indeterminacy; the latter is 
statistically weighted (i.e., using cardinal value registers) according to past measures of 
actualization (i.e., empirical social facts). 
One example of the indeterminacy of fragments is the debate that Joshua O. Reno 
explores with respect to the future determination of waste in landfills. The question is whether 
the radical indeterminacy of future outcomes advances the anthropological task of explaining 
social practices. The waste fragment eschews relations, but relations linger, and as Reno 
concedes, waste management regulations (and, we would add, the entire social world of formal 
and informal interactions and devices in which it is entangled) make certain outcomes more 
possible than others. 
Indeterminacy also differs from ambiguity if one defines ambiguity as the possibility that 
an entity has several simultaneous and potentially contradictory meanings. In language, 
ambiguity defines a situation in which an utterance’s truth value can be interpreted in different 
ways, although generally disambiguation is possible by clarifying context. Ambiguity also calls 
to mind Peircean indexicality, signs that have no meaning in and of themselves but acquire value 
when placed in a particular context. Yet indexes are always potentially multivalent. Semantic 
vagueness addresses a similar problem, namely that of utterances that are not semantically 
precise, and therefore whose truth value is uncertain. In some cases, vagueness can be resolved 
by reference to context, but in other cases it is impossible to determine the truth value of the 
utterance (Kennedy 2011). These problems in the philosophy of language are relevant because 
they address questions of “mapping” or positioning within a semantic grid. Likewise, they 
discuss truth value judgments and point to cases where it is impossible to adjudicate meaning 
between adjacent categories, revealing the unknowable aspect of certain vague propositions. A 
pressing issue that emerges, then, is to determine the relevance of vagueness in classificatory 
systems, focusing on cases where truth value cannot be determined. The present volume 
addresses this through a particular construction of indeterminacy. 
Lastly, indeterminacy is not uncertainty, if uncertainty is what people experience, for 
instance, when they face the risk of stock market speculation or when they engage in extreme 
sports that challenge norms of safety. Uncertainty is also embedded in the potential misfirings 
and misalignments of face-to-face communication, in the firm cultural belief in the opacity of 
other people’s minds (Rumsey and Robbins 2008), or in the collapse of political regimes that 
formerly provided clear answers to existential questions. Ironically, the neoliberal faith in 
optimal market allocation expresses the will to minimize uncertainty by focusing attention on the 
individual’s actual behavior, thus eliciting the tacit (often unconscious) knowledge hidden in 
natural communication systems (Hayek 1948; Polanyi 1967). The market makes hidden tacit 
knowledge transparent and allegedly minimizes uncertainty in the allocation of resources 
through the competitive process and the pricing mechanism. Behavioral economics and big-data 
analysis have compounded this theory: measuring actions supersedes the need to understand 
actions, and the uncertainty of the future is statistically minimized. Hence high risk (and 
potential gain) accrues from countering predictable outcomes and hedging against predictable 
loss. For the editors, uncertainty is relevant to indeterminacy “only insofar as it reflects 
conditions of dissolution or category loss produced by economic and political exclusion; the 
material infrastructure of previous times that has yet to find its place; and, finally, a sense that 
future pathways are rarely as determined as grand narratives suggest but emerge as a dialogue 
between people’s attempts to plan and shape futures and contingent events beyond their control” 
(Alexander and Sanchez this volume). The value of indeterminacy as a concept, then, hinges on a 
critique of totalizing categorization and on causal determination of future outcomes. 
If indeterminacy differs from the more widely theorized categories of liminality, 
ambiguity and uncertainty, one can also ask what it shares with them. For example, while early 
theorists of liminality did indeed see liminal states as transitions from one well-defined category 
to another, one can ask whether this was not an artifice of their own anxieties about structure, 
and whether, in actuality, liminal entities always emanate from a stable category and are 
eventually transformed into another stable category. Rather, they may well be suspended in a 
state that is too vague and heterogeneous to be domesticated by extant systems of classification, 
from which they challenge these classificatory systems. This is the case, for example, of 
transgender categories in Polynesia and elsewhere, which do not conform to locally recognizable 
gender categories but instead index a nebulous outsiderness and generic cosmopolitanism (which 
themselves are the object of constant negotiation and anxiety) that confront the moral codes in 
which local gender categories are anchored (Besnier 2011). This is also the case of people in 
extreme exclusionary spaces devoid of future expectation such as Nazi concentration camps, 
where moral categories that used to frame their past social life were suspended beyond 
classificatory orders, a situation that does not preclude social interaction regulated both 
externally and internally, albeit beyond classification (Narotzky and Moreno 2002). Thus 
“permanent” liminality may not be as oxymoronic as it may appear at first glance and, viewed in 
this light, liminality may share more with indeterminacy than it differs from it. In these 
examples, indeterminacy is an active situation with which people engage creatively, as the 
editors point out, but often strive to create some sort of predictable outcome. 
 
Excess, Residue, Exclusion, and Hidden Connections 
A particularly thought-provoking aspect of indeterminacy as an analytic category is its capacity 
to help us understand how some entities remain outside extant systems of classification. Thus, in 
Joshua Reno’s analysis of garbage landfills in the United States, the fragment of paper that 
escapes the rubbish collectors or the potential toxic leak from the landfill are indeterminate 
because they potentially undermine the boundary between the filth and danger of the landfill and 
the wholesomeness and safety of lived space. They are also indeterminate because the manner of 
their incorporation with other fragments in the landfill (or outside of it) is unknown, and the 
possibility that they will remain outside any category systems is open. 
However, whether entities can be entirely disconnected from systems of classification is 
an empirical question. Thus the fragment of paper or the leak continues to be embedded in 
structures of social relations and in economic systems. Fragments of paper on the side of the road 
enable the people employed to pick them up to make a living and the leak ensures that the 
expertise of the people in charge of analyzing it continues to be useful. So both the piece of 
paper and the leaking substance are still connected to a context that provides various possible 
meanings. Even a totalizing classificatory system, such as the law, is in fact full of loopholes, 
which is the reason why the practice of the law gives so much attention to interpretation and 
precedent. In Norway, as Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Cathrine Moe Thorleifsson document in 
this volume, the state has exerted considerable efforts to absorb the minority group of Travellers 
into its modernist project based on settled existence, wage work, and education, but some 
Travellers have contested these efforts by asserting difference in a national context anxiously 
predicated on homogeneity. The newcomer Roma, in contrast, have not been so successful in 
that the state has no interest in integrating them and many want them to “go back where they 
came from,” precluding any kind of mobilization in a political arena in which they have no say. 
The contributions to this volume provide precisely the kind of ethnographic materials that 
provoke a debate about under what conditions and from what perspective an entity falls outside 
of a system of classification. They suggest that the terms “debate,” “struggle” and “contention” 
should be wedded to any discussion of determinacy: what we are witnessing in the various case 
studies are anxieties and conflicts over what can be determined and what cannot, about who 
defines the grids of classification and how, what devices and technical infrastructures support 
categorization and standardization, and what power can be brought to bear in the making and 
unmaking of particular webs of (in)determination. Indeterminacy is always in dialogue with 
determinacy, from which it derives its very meaning. 
The comparison of the various ethnographic contexts represented in this collection 
conjures a question that we consider important: what is the entity that lacks determinacy? 
Different indeterminate entities pose different questions. For example, the figure of the 
“repatriate” or oralman in Kazakhstan (Alexander), people of Kazakh origin whom the state 
invites to migrate “back” to the country, is indeterminate in several ways. The oralman does not 
find a place in the state’s dominant discourse of progress “from a fixed past to a desired future,” 
both because the oralman is a backward country bumpkin and emerges from a larger world that 
the state strives to be part of. The figure also falls between the cracks of census categories, as the 
oralman is at once neither Kazakh nor immigrant, but both. In addition, repatriates often lack 
state-issued identification, a lack that can be as empowering and liberating as it can be restrictive 
and precarious. Seen as a property of an entity (a person or a figure), indeterminacy is a matter of 
ontology. But all these modes of indeterminacy can be also understood as characteristics of 
relationships, between the oralman and the state in particular, but also between the oralman and 
an “ordinary” Kazakh, in which case indeterminacy is no longer a matter of ontology, but of 
shifting social relations, which in our view calls for different questions. 
Thus people who do not belong and objects that stand outside recognized classification 
regimes are invariably embedded in webs of relationships of their own. Such webs can connect 
the person or object to the system that expelled them in the first place, as in the case of refugees 
from the Middle East and elsewhere in the contemporary moment, who are suspended in 
indeterminacy in Western Europe (unwanted by Eastern and Southern Europe, yet forced by the 
Dublin Convention to remain there); yet they are still connected to the national contexts whose 
wars they are escaping, they become connected to NGOs and solidarity networks that provide 
support, and they create structures of their own. The indeterminate can produce their own system 
of classification and their own expulsion, as is the case of Polynesian transgender who lay claim 
to a larger world of morality that exceeds the provincialism of the local. Indeterminacy as a 
feature of relationships provides a different perspective and raises different questions from 
indeterminacy as an ontological category. 
Indeterminacy showcases the future in primordial fashion. If something is determined, 
then what is going to happen in the future is known or at least knowable; in contrast, 
indeterminacy is the negation of a clear path toward the future. This is where the contrast 
between indeterminacy and uncertainty becomes productive: uncertainty is contained by the 
management of risk, whereas indeterminacy does not assume that the future can be controlled, 
because the risk is unknown. However, thinking in terms of risk implies an a priory binary 
contrast between gain and loss that generates either good or bad results of action (by an 
individual rational agent) within a moralized framework. An alternative is to abide by the 
assumption in physics that indeterminacy, devoid of its moral orientation, does not lead to risk 
but instead to outcomes that are unknowable but can be circumscribed through empirical 
calculation, thereby minimizing the unknown. 
This is the essence of the debate about the future of waste between sociologists Myra 
Hird (2013) and Zsusza Gille (2013) that Reno animates: for the former, what will happen to a 
landfill is ultimately unknowable because its contents are indeterminate and its future is 
completely open, which presents a paradox for political activism focused on making waste 
determinate; for the latter, we know enough about what may happen when waste leaks and poses 
a danger to the environment to swing into action. Knowledge about anything comes in many 
forms and is always partial and situated (Haraway 1988), and knowledge about the future of 
waste is no exception; we may not know what the chemical reactions are going to be from waste 
leakage, but we know at least that there is going to be a reaction, upon which we can base an 
activist politics. The fact that the future is unknowable does not to imply that our actions, 
particularly political ones, are not projected toward certain goals. Likewise, it does not imply that 
evidence about past social facts is irrelevant in the attempt to know the future outcomes of 
present actions. 
At the same time, human actions generate material results, be they in the form of 
infrastructures, objects, regulations, and so on, which are embedded in historical processes that 
are themselves complex and multi-faceted. Thus in the same fashion that indeterminacy is about 
the future, it is also about the past. Our projects are always embedded in and informed by pre-
existing structures, webs of relations, and selective memories of moralized outcomes of human 
actions. Indeed, what is particularly thought-provoking is the power of our actions to articulate a 
knowable past with an indeterminate future, yet this power is bounded by the fact that the result 
of our actions (and their interpretation) can differ significantly from the intentions that 
underpinned them and for differently situated actors. 
The gigantic industrial infrastructures erected in Bremerhaven, Germany, in the late 
nineteenth century and over the course of the twentieth century, are a particularly telling example 
(Ringel this volume). Some of the structures in question, such as the Emperor’s Lock, were 
considered utter folly when they were originally built because of their unnecessarily grandiose 
proportions, yet they ended up having a new life when megaships emerged that were in need of 
large berthing facilities. Postindustrial downturns made other structures obsolete and they were 
abandoned, until they were made economically productive again for urban renewal and tourism. 
In contrast, the city’s “scrap houses” are today deemed too derelict to do much with, and they 
just stand there—but who knows what novel use may be found for them in future, in the same 
way that the outsized shipping facilities are ridiculous at one moment and a godsend at another? 
As Marxist theorists of urban gentrification (e.g., Harvey 1973; Smith 1996) have demonstrated, 
capital accumulation takes place when the build environment is devalued, tenants are 
dispossessed, and urban space is revalorized. In order to produce value from inner-city centers, 
they first have to be depleted of value and alienated from their original purpose. These examples 
illustrate the constant transformation over time of the meaning of categories, objects, and 
practices and the temporal fragility of the boundary between the knowable and the unknowable, 
the determined and the undetermined. 
 
Worthlessness, Waste, Value, and Worth 
As matter and metaphor, waste is provocative. If we understand waste as removed from 
dominant systems of value, it also appears as a space of creativity that may produce other values, 
a position of hope that may challenge dominant classification systems with other forms of 
recognition. Indeterminacy thus emerges as a Janus-faced category, signaling both the 
displacement to an outside realm and the opening of domains of possible worlds. But how does it 
relate to value if valuation is understood as a multiple and overlapping grid of classificatory 
systems involving nominal, ordinal, and cardinal judgments, with their vagueness and loopholes? 
Is waste opposed to value? How is the production of value predicated on the production of 
waste? 
In Elisabeth Schober’s account of scavengers in Subic Bay, Philippines, unwaged 
workers order and classify the waste that they sell to intermediaries, a task that their leader 
Glenda defines as having value in market terms: “Remember, it has capital. Yes, it’s all garbage, 
but it has capital.” These are people who have been dispossessed of their former means of 
livelihood (fishing, agriculture) because of land and water grabbing and later of the possibility of 
wage work. As a result, they have gravitated to the landfill near a Special Economic Zone to 
make a living by scavenging. Their lives are devalued as they are excluded from other means of 
making a living and they are defined by others as a surplus population. But they define their 
work as “work,” a category that commands recognition and respect and is validated by the 
anthropologist and the left-wing activists who guide her. Moreover, they are aware of the value 
work commands both economically, as it reenters the chain of value through intermediaries, and 
politically, as they leverage their power to disrupt peace and drive away investments. One could 
argue that the agency, power, and hope of their politics is not so much one of indeterminacy as 
one that rests on the tension between worth and worthlessness, value and waste. As they become 
worthless according to a regime of value focused on waste and squalor, they reconfigure other 
forms of self-worth and produce other kinds of economic and political value, through struggle 
and negotiation, which are partially linked to capital. 
Tensions between worthlessness and worth-making are central to understanding how 
capitalist accumulation works (Alexander and Reno 2012). Marxism captured some of these 
tensions with the concept of surplus population, but even more so with the concept of primitive 
accumulation, which David Harvey (2003) further expanded as accumulation by dispossession. 
Enclosures produced people who had become worthless unless they entered into a particular 
relation with the owners of the means of production. This situation benefitted people at the upper 
end of a scale of social worth now measured in cardinal terms of aggregate wealth. 
Simultaneously, other scales of social and moral worth emerged based on respect for work and 
solidarity, which competed with scales of valuation based on wealth. This is but one possible 
story of world actualization, and we are not advocating for a teleological modern grand narrative. 
But it is about relationships that are formed and transformed through shifting connections, 
overlapping grids of meaning and vagueness, rather than about ordered totalities from which 
fragments (physical, semantic) are detached, suspended in an indeterminate position, eventually 
to be recognized by other imagined ordered worlds. As Alexander and Sanchez suggest in their 
introduction, “the will to control through fixity, numbering, containment, and classifications, is 
typically manifested through the modern state, which expels, [or] forcibly assimilates … those 
who do not fit” (Alexander and Sanchez this volume) makes the exclusion and displacement of 
indeterminacy a potential space of opportunity, creativity, and hope. The will and the struggle to 
control, we argue, is also based on multiple grids of value and systems of valuation overlapping, 
conflicting, and connecting, claiming transient power through ambiguity and vagueness, 
eschewing fixity to assert control. 
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